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Abstract 
 
In this paper we study the relationship between communication and ”transparency 
of information” and governance by exploring the link between social media and 
natural resource governance. Using a cross-country analysis, we document a 
robust and statistically significant positive relationship between Facebook 
penetration (a proxy for social media) and natural resource governance. It follows 
that countries with higher facebook penetration levels enjoy natural resource 
governance of better quality than countries with low levels of facebook 
penetration. The positive effect of facebook is robust to controlling for other 
determinants of institutional quality, additional controls, outliers, inter alia. 
Keywords: Natural Resources, Rents, Institutions, Governance, Social Media, 
Facebook, Internet, Transparency of information 
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1. Introduction 
The effects of natural resources are a major concern in the scientific literature 
(Stevens, 2003; Van der Ploeg, 2011; Frankel, 2012; Van der Ploeg & Poelhekke, 
2016). Some have conveyed even the idea of a curse of natural resources (e.g. 
Sachs & Warner, 2001). However, this so-called curse or policy syndrome is 
conditioned by the presence of poor quality institutions (e.g. Mehlum et al., 2006; 
Tcheta-Bampa & Kodila-Tedika, 2018a, b)
1
. This literature did not dissociate 
governance in the natural resources sector from all other sectors or dimensions. 
Recently, the Natural Resource Governance Institute has established specific 
governance indicators for the natural resources sector. The objective of this 
research is therefore to focus on the specific governance of this sector using this 
specific indicator. More concretely, we try to understand in this paper how to 
improve the governance of this sector. As a result, we test the hypothesis that 
social media (social network) can improve the quality of governance in the natural 
resources sector. To this end, we mobilize the arguments of the literature which 
suggest that informed citizens and/or the circulation of information discipline 
politicians, but also improve governance (e.g. Besley & Burgess 2002; Besley & 
Prat, 2006; Stromberg, 2004; Reinikka & Svensson 2004; Eisensee & Stromberg 
2007; Ferraz & Finan 2008, Snyder & Strömberg, 2010; Strömberg, 2016). This 
information includes the internet and its corollaries (Andersen et al., 2011).  
Social (media) networks should positively impact the quality of governance in the 
natural resources sector through several channels. Social networks (media) can 
naturally be expected to discipline managers and inform citizens of bad 
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 Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017a) understand policy syndrome in the perspective of non-
inclusive development whereas according to Asongu (2017), it as a gap knowledge economy. 
Within the framework of this paper a policy syndrome is poor governance. 
governance. For example, cases of corruption (which is a characteristic of bad 
governance) can be quickly relayed via social media to the population in the light 
of the speed of information flow via social networks. Networks not only serve to 
punish bad practices but also generate incentives to put social gain above private 
gain (Snyder & Strömberg, 2010). They can also improve governance by 
disseminating best practices in this area. Kodila-Tedika (2014) suggests, for 
example that governance also improves because of imitation. Another channel is 
that of the political selection (Strömberg, 1999; Prat & Strömberg, 2013). In this 
case, social networks (media) can help place competent people for the better 
governance of natural resources. 
To test this hypothesis, we examine the link between the governance variable of 
the Natural Resource Governance Institute and Facebook penetration. The latter 
has recently been used in the literature as a social media proxy (eg Jha & Sarangi, 
2017; Jha & Kodila-Tedika, 2018). Our econometric exercise leads us to validate 
our hypothesis. Countries with strong Facebook penetration also show better 
governance in natural resources. This conclusion is robust to changes in 
estimation techniques, outliers, the decomposition of the indicator of governance 
in natural resources, the addition of other control variables and even the bias of 
inverted causality or endogeneity.  
The present research is related to the literature which studies the determinants of 
governance. Contributions within this strand of literature include Chong and 
Zanforlin (2000), Potrafke (2012), Kelejian et al. (2013), Alonso & Garcimartín 
(2013), Kodila-Tedika & Tcheta-Bampa (2014), Rindermann et al. (2015) and 
Asongu & Kodila-Tedika (2016). It is also relevant to note that the positioning of 
the study departs from a recent strand of literature that defines governance 
exclusively from political (political stability/no violence and voice & 
accountability), economic (regulation quality and government effectiveness) and 
institutional (rule of law and corruption-control) perspectives (Oluwatobi et al., 
2015; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a, b; Asongu et al., 2017a). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 overviews the literature on 
the consequences of social media while the data and methodology are disclosed in 
Section 3. The empirical results and corresponding sensitivity checks are 
disclosed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Related Literature  
Our paper is recorded in the recent empirical literature on the consequences of 
new media or social networks (media)2. This literature has taken at least three 
directions. First, the studies have focused on election process events such as 
campaigns, campaign contributions, and so on (Hong & Nadler, 2011, Metaxas & 
Eni 2012, Petrova et al., 2016).  Second, other works have considered specific 
political events. Enikolopo et al. (2017) provide evidence that penetration of VK, 
the dominant Russian online social network, affected protest activity during a 
wave of protests in Russia in 2011. Also, they provide suggestive evidence that 
cities with higher fractionalization of network users between VK and Facebook 
experienced fewer protests. In the same sense, other empirical papers have found 
the same conclusion in the context of Egypt (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Halberstam 
& Knight, 2016; Acemoglu et al., 2018). 
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For a theoretical introduction to this literature, the interested reader can refer to Prat & Strömberg 
(2013). 
The third direction is that of our research. It focuses on governance issues. 
Enikolopov et al. (2018) suggest that social media can discipline corruption even 
in a country with limited political competition and heavily censored traditional 
media. Also, they show that blog posts, which exposed corruption in Russian 
state-controlled companies, had a negative causal impact on their market returns. 
Qin et al. (2016, 2017) find that a large number of real-world protests can be 
predicted by social media data one day before their occurrence and that corruption 
charges on specific individuals can be predicted one year in advance. These 
findings support the view that social media can be effective surveillance tools for 
autocratic governments. These findings suggest that the Chinese government 
regulates social media to balance threats to regime stability against the benefits of 
utilizing bottom-up information. Jha and Sarangi (2017) found a causal 
relationship between Facebook penetration and corruption. Our research is closely 
linked to this last direction. The positioning of the study departs from a growing 
stream of literature on the use of information technology for social, 
entrepreneurial and environmental outcomes (Bongomin et al., 2018 ; Gosavi, 
2017; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c; Hubani & Wiese, 2017 ; Issahaku et al., 
2017; Minkoua Nzie et al., 2017 ; Muthinja & Chipeta, 2017 ; Asongu & Le 
Roux, 2017 ; Afutu-Kotey et al., 2017;  Asongu et al., 2017a, 2018).  
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
To measure Natural Resource Governance, we use data from the Natural Resource 
Governance Institute. This variable is a composite indicator that is based on four 
dimensions, notably: institutional and legal setting, reporting practices, safeguards 
and quality controls and enabling environment. This indicator moves in the range 
of 0 to 100, the best situation. 
To measure social networks or social media, we use the share of the population 
using Facebook. Facebook penetration data comes from „Quintly', a social media 
benchmarking and analytics Solution Company.
3
 The latter has recently been used 
in the literature as a social media proxy (e.g. Jha & Sarangi, 2017; Jha & Kodila-
Tedika, 2018). 
The choice of control variables is also motivated by institutional development 
literature. They include: open, GDP per capita rights, Minerals rents and legal 
origins (British, German, French and Scandinavian). Natural resources exports is 
measured by Mineral rents (% of GDP) to account for the effect of the rent-
seeking opportunities due to the presence of natural resources. Finally, openness 
to trade is measured by the GDP share of the value of total exports and imports. 
Dummy variables for legal origins come from La Porta et al. (1999). The data on 
GDP per capita and trade come from Pen World Tables. 
3.2. Methodology 
In order to investigate the relationship between Facebook penetration and natural 
resource governance, we estimate the following equation:  
                                                        
     (             )                            (1) 
where subscript i denotes the country. Note that we use the negative of the 
corruption index so that a higher value means higher corruption implying that 
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 The data was accessed from its website (http://www.quintly.com/facebook-country-
statistics?period=1year)  
estimated parameters corresponding to β and δ are expected display negative 
signs. Finally,   is the intercept,   captures the effect of average Facebook 
penetration on natural resource governance while   = (  ;    ; .  ) is the 
parameter for the control variables. Our parameter of interest is thus  . Table 1 
lists the countries that are included in our baseline specification. 
Table 1. Countries included in the baseline specification (Table 3. Column 3) 
Australia Kazakhstan 
Azerbaijan Kuwait 
Bahrain Morocco 
Bolivia Mexico 
Brazil Mongolia 
Botswana Mozambique 
Canada Malaysia 
Chile Nigeria 
China Norway 
Cameroon Peru 
Colombia Philippines 
Algeria Russian Federation 
Ecuador Trinidad and Tobago 
Egypt United Republic of Tanzania 
Gabon United States 
United Kingdom Venezuela 
Ghana Vietnam 
Indonesia South Africa 
India Zambia 
We perform our analysis on the empirical model specified in Equation (1) above 
using essentially ordinary least square (OLS) regression model. To correct for 
likely heteroscedasticity, we present white-corrected standard errors. 
Reverse causality is a concern in this study. Indeed, Facebook penetration is a 
variable that is not entirely exogenous. Given that the estimations by the OLS 
technique may be weak in the endogeneity issue, we verify the robustness of 
corresponding estimates by employing an estimation technique that corrects the 
presence of such endogeneity. For this purpose of robustness we employ Two-
stage-least squares (2SLS) estimation technique. 
Table 2 provides the summary statistics for all the variables used in this study and 
Table 3 provides the resulting correlation matrix. 
  
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs         Mean     Std. Dev.        Min         Max 
Composite  59     50.47    20.12    4.28 98.018 
Institutional and legal setting 
59     58.80     21.05    8.33 100 
Reporting practices 
59     49.90     22.80    4.17     97.44 
Safeguards and quality  controls 
59     54.03     22.84           0    98.26 
Enabling environment 
59     39.72      26.00   2.25   97.54 
Facebook  180     20.95     18.40    .038   97.64 
British Legal origin  
141     .28     .452 0           1 
French Legal origin  
141     .45      .50 0           1 
Socialist legal origin. 
141     .19      .39           0           1 
German legal origin 
141     .04     .20          0           1 
Scandinavian Legal origin  
141     .04 .19 0           1 
GDP per capita (log) 
140     8.87 1.19 5.90    11.17 
Open  140     95.42    57.16 26.65 446.06 
Internet penetration 192     35.53 27.56           .7 94.82 
Minerals  128     9.13 14.83   .01 79.85 
IQ 177     84.30     10.93        61.2       106.90 
Ethnicity  124     .363    .32 0           1 
Oecd 137     .21 .41 0           1 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix    
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Composite (1) 1.000         
Facebook  (2) 0.704    1.000        
legal origin British (3) 0.222    0.140    1.000       
French Legal origin (4) -0.151    0.041   -0.687    1.000      
Socialist legal origin 
(5) 
-0.259   -0.385   -0.331   -0.390    1.000     
Scandinavian Legal 
origin (6) 
0.390 0.324 -0.126 -0.148   -0.071         1.000    
GDP per capita (7) 0.528    0.792   0.108   -0.125   -0.101         0.292    1.000   
Open (8) -0.388       0.009 0.072   -0.260    0.268         -0.020    0.080    1.000  
Mineral rents (9) 0.039   -0.085    0.003    0.009    0.009         -0.058   -0.258   -0.064    1.000 
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1. OLS Estimation 
We present the OLS results in Table 4. In the baseline specification reported in 
Column 1, we find that the coefficient of media social index is positive and highly 
statistically significant suggesting a positive relationship between media social 
and natural resource governance. In the next columns, we control for a number of 
variables to check the robustness of our results and to minimize the possibility of 
omitted variable bias. We find that the probable variable bias omitted does not 
affect our results. 
  
Table 4. The Effect of Social Media on Natural Resource Governance : OLS 
Estimates 
 
I II III 
Facebook 0.756*** 0.619*** 0.747*** 
 
(0.115) (0.108) (0.162) 
Dummy legal origin British 
 
2.092 -12.356 
  
(5.647) (9.827) 
Dummy legal origin French 
 
-3.631 -21.593** 
  
(5.481) (9.838) 
Dummy legal origin: Socialist. 
 
(dropped) -9.400 
   
(11.085) 
Dummy legal origin: 
Scandinavian  
17.094 
 
  
(13.303) 
 
GDP per capita (log) 
  
-2.082 
   
(2.713) 
Open 
  
-0.202*** 
   
(0.041) 
Minerals rents 
  
0.042 
   
(0.075) 
_cons 39.457*** 46.113*** 92.785*** 
 
(2.743) (4.613) (24.475) 
Number of observations 53 42 38 
R2 0.459 0.587 0.762 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
    
4.2. Robustness checks 
Results with sub-indexes 
The natural resource governance variable used is a composite index that has four 
components, notably: institutional and legal setting, reporting practices, 
safeguards and quality controls, and enabling environment. One way to consider 
the strength of the effect of Facebook penetration on natural resource governance 
is related to the variable of interest in its sub-dimensions. Figures 1 portrays the 
relationship between each of the four sub-indexes of natural ressource governance 
(y-axis) and facebook penetration (x-axis) for the countries included in our 
sample. 
Figure 1. Sub-indexes of natural resource governance and Facebook 
penetration 
 
  
  
 
Figure 1 exhibits a positive and significant relationship between each relevant 
measure of four sub-indexes of natural resource governance and the penetration 
Facebook. In panel (a),   = .385 (p-value = 0.014) for institutional and legal 
setting; in panel (b),   = .829 (p-value = 0.000) for reporting practices; in panel 
(c)   = .579 (p-value= 0.001) for safeguards and quality  controls; and in panel (d) 
  = 1.154 (p-value = 0.000) for the enabling environment. In each of the simple 
regression models, Facebook penetration explains the variations in the four sub-
indexes of natural resource governance: 11.3% of the variations in institutional 
and legal setting, 43.7% of the variations in reporting practices, 20.5% of the 
variations in safeguards and quality controls; and 60.% of the variations in the 
enabling environment. 
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These statistical conclusions are estimates with simple regressions. They are 
therefore simple correlations, likely to be fragile once the other variables can 
affect these controlled dimensions. Table 5 therefore uses the same variables in 
the last column of Table 4. Facebook penetration is positively and statistically 
related to the different components of the Natural Resources Governance index. 
The level of significance is very strong, except for safeguards and quality 
controls. 
Table 5.Regression Results with Sub-Indexes 
 
Institutional 
and legal 
setting 
Reporting 
practices 
Safeguards 
and quality  
controls 
Enabling 
environment 
Facebook 0.688*** 0.950*** 0.518* 0.629*** 
 
(0.223) (0.222) (0.276) (0.227) 
Dummy legal origin British -25.386* -8.820 -14.051 -4.701 
 
(13.519) (13.459) (16.757) (13.792) 
Dummy legal origin French -28.376** -13.166 -28.816* -24.441* 
 
(13.534) (13.474) (16.775) (13.807) 
Dummy legal origin: Socialist. -15.881 2.136 -17.161 -18.229 
 
(15.250) (15.181) (18.901) (15.557) 
GDP per capita (log) -7.551* -2.942 -2.470 5.495 
 
(3.732) (3.715) (4.626) (3.807) 
Open -0.191*** -0.237*** -0.238*** -0.109* 
 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.070) (0.057) 
Minerals rents 0.150 -0.064 -0.041 0.229** 
 
(0.103) (0.103) (0.128) (0.106) 
_cons 155.149*** 93.024*** 113.275** 9.455 
 
(33.670) (33.519) (41.733) (34.349) 
Number of observations 38 38 38 38 
R2 0.531 0.684 0.489 0.763 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
     
Outliers 
Table 6 presents results that control for outliers. The empirical approach follows 
Huber (1973) on the use of Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares (IRWLS). As 
has been noted by Midi and Talib (2008), in comparison to OLS, the procedure 
has the advantage of producing robust estimators because it simultaneously fixes  
any concern arising from the presence of outliers and/or heteroskedasticity (non-
constant error variances). By correcting this problem, we find that the conclusions 
found remained the same, except for the variable “safeguards and quality 
controls”. In different terms, these conclusions are not influenced by outliers. 
Table 6. Controlling from outliers  
 
Composite 
Institutional 
and legal 
setting 
Reporting 
practices 
Safeguards 
and quality  
controls 
Enabling 
environment 
Facebook 0.737*** 0.708*** 0.880*** 0.506 0.706*** 
 
(0.177) (0.235) (0.272) (0.313) (0.211) 
Dummy legal origin British -2.820 -9.281 -9.604 5.399 15.144** 
 
(5.581) (7.398) (8.555) (9.842) (6.630) 
Dummy legal origin French -11.904** -13.256* -14.265 -9.625 -5.536 
 
(5.719) (7.582) (8.767) (10.086) (6.794) 
lgdpcap2005 -1.820 -8.557** -1.664 -3.038 3.694 
 
(2.971) (3.939) (4.555) (5.240) (3.530) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.200*** -0.202*** -0.237*** -0.239*** -0.127** 
 
(0.045) (0.059) (0.069) (0.079) (0.053) 
Open 0.044 0.127 -0.068 -0.051 0.217** 
 
(0.082) (0.109) (0.126) (0.145) (0.098) 
Minerals rents 80.740*** 150.072*** 84.322** 99.724** 8.525 
 
(26.382) (34.974) (40.444) (46.527) (31.342) 
Number of observations 37 37 37 37 37 
R2 0.680 0.444 0.547 0.376 0.768 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
      
Additional controls 
The results we found may be due to characteristics of unobserved or controlled 
countries. This can actually support a relationship between our variable to explain 
and our variable of interest. It is possible that this relationship is due to an 
omission bias. To mitigate this possibility, we control for additional variables that 
could be correlated with the unexplained component of Natural Resource 
Governance. The results of this exercise are summarised in Table 7. To allow for 
comparisons, we report the estimated results of the baseline model (these are 
identical to those presented in column (3) of Table 4). 
We controlled Internet penetration, human capital measured by the IQ, ethnicity 
and the dummy of the OECD.  The data for internet penetration have been taken 
from the World Bank. Internet penetration data is defined as the percentage of 
population with an internet connection.  IQ is measured by National average 
intelligence. The intelligence data are sourced from Meisenberg & Lynn (2011). 
Ethnicity is an index of ethnic diversity (Easterly & Levine, 1997). The effects of 
ethnic diversity especially on institutions and natural resources are documented in 
the literature (Alesina et al., 2016; Fenske & Zurimendi, 2017).  Kodila-Tedika 
(2014) and Kodila-Tedika & Kalonda-Kanyama (2012) have showed that there is 
a link between governance/institution and IQ. The effect of internet penetration on 
governance is known (Andersen et al., 2011). The dummy consideration for the 
OECD is justified by the fact that these countries have the most elaborate 
economic and even political structures. Given the small size of the sample, we do 
not know how to break down the sample in two: on the one hand, the sample of 
developed economies and the other on developing economies. As a result, we did 
not want to lose more or less this information. 
Table 7 shows that despite the inclusion of new control variables, the results 
remain the same. A strong Facebook penetration is accompanied by an 
improvement in the governance of natural resources, except for the last two 
columns which take up two components of the governance of natural resources. 
 
 
Table 7. OLS regressions with additional controls 
 
Composite 
Institutional 
and legal 
setting 
Reporting 
practices 
Safeguards 
and quality  
controls 
Enabling 
environment 
Facebook 0.714** 0.792* 0.824** 0.586 0.542 
 
(0.285) (0.386) (0.385) (0.473) (0.414) 
Internet penetration  -0.179 -0.199 -0.168 -0.113 -0.248 
 
(0.191) (0.258) (0.257) (0.316) (0.277) 
IQ 0.455 -0.205 0.821 0.511 0.328 
 
(0.462) (0.624) (0.624) (0.765) (0.670) 
Ethnicity -4.538 6.478 -4.790 -17.193 -2.396 
 
(9.274) (12.533) (12.517) (15.353) (13.450) 
OECD 4.172 16.809 3.031 -8.403 6.394 
 
(7.890) (10.663) (10.649) (13.062) (11.443) 
_cons 46.011 142.881* 27.905 84.557 -53.194 
 
(52.488) (70.936) (70.848) (86.899) (76.129) 
Number of observations 32 32 32 32 32 
R2 0.739 0.541 0.689 0.531 0.719 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
      
A Fractional Response Model Approach 
The variable we are trying to explain is a bounded variable. In this case, the 
MCO-type model may be inefficient at capturing the nonlinear effects that the 
control variables may have on the dependent variable. In addition, the inclusion of 
non-linear functions of control variables in such models to address this problem 
can lead to predicted values that lie outside the bounded range (Wooldridge, 
2010). Nevertheless, we test the robustness of our results using an alternative 
empirical model that might be appropriate when the dependent variable is 
bounded. 
As a result, the fractional response model is an appropriate response. It is a quasi-
likelihood estimation method that models the average of the dependent variable as 
a function of the independent variables. This model is an appropriate estimation 
method if the values of the dependent variable are between 0 and 1 (Papke & 
Wooldridge 1996, Wooldridge, 2010). As a result, we are transforming our 
natural resource governance index so that they take values in the range of 0 and 1 
with a higher value implying a better situation. In this estimation method, we use 
a probit model for the conditional mean. These results are presented in Table 8. 
Column 1 summarizes the estimates for the composite variable of natural resource 
governance. The rest of the columns show the different components of the index, 
except for institutional and legal setting. For this dimension of the composite 
index, the econometric results do not converge. Thus, we cannot include these 
results. The estimated coefficient of social media index (Facebook) is positive and 
statistically significant at the conventional levels in each column. These results 
reaffirm the positive relationship between social media and natural resource 
governance.  
Table 8. The Effect of Social Media on Natural Ressource Governance : A 
Fractional Response Model 
 
Composite 
Reporting 
practices  
Safeguards and 
quality controls  
Enabling 
environment 
Facebook 0.021*** 0.027*** 0.015** 0.019*** 
 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Dummy legal origin British -1.032*** -0.772*** -1.142*** -0.673*** 
 
(0.090) (0.160) (0.187) (0.159) 
Dummy legal origin French -1.307*** -0.933*** -1.559*** -1.255*** 
 
(0.113) (0.148) (0.171) (0.176) 
Dummy legal origin: Socialist. -0.950*** -0.483** -1.224*** -1.015*** 
 
(0.129) (0.218) (0.244) (0.212) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.049 -0.072 -0.062 0.146* 
 
(0.070) (0.096) (0.105) (0.080) 
Open -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Minerals rents 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.006* 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
_cons 1.813*** 1.672** 2.435*** -0.475 
 
(0.636) (0.786) (0.926) (0.727) 
Number of observations 38 38 38 38 
Pseudo-R2 0.0710 0.0886 0.0638 0.1314 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
     
 Instrumental Variable Estimation 
The observed relationship may suffer from a probable problem of endogeneity, 
notably on a bias of omission. We correct this potential problem by using a 2SLS 
model. We mobilize two instruments. First, we use the instrument used by Jha and 
Sarangi (2017) and Jha and Kodila-Tedika (2018). We use technology adoption in 
communication in 1500CE as an instrument for Facebook penetration (technology 
adoption) today. The measure of technology adoption in communication in 1500 
CE is consistent with Comin et al. (2010). 
The second instrument is historical human capital. The specifications accounts for 
indicators of human capital accumulation in terms of primary and secondary 
school enrolments. The variable which is obtained from Mitchell (2003a, b, c) 
denotes the number of students per kilometer square in the 1920s. In order to use 
social networks, a minimum of instruction is required. This variable captures this 
minimum. It has the advantage of being historical and therefore has a certain 
precedence with respect to the governance of natural resources, the difference of 
which has presented itself more in the contemporary or post-colonial period. In 
the colonial era, it was dictated by the nature of the colony, either extractive or 
populated (Acemoglu et al., 2001, Kodila-Tedika & Tcheta-Bampa, 2018b). This 
historical human capital variable has already been used as an instrument in studies 
of governance change (Glaeser et al., 2004 ; Tebaldi & Mohan, 2010 ; Asongu & 
Kodila-Tedika, 2017). 
Sargan's over-identification test is valid. The instruments meet the statistical 
criteria to be considered as sufficiently exogenous to Facebook penetration. As a 
result, the conclusions derived from the estimates in Table 9 refer to a causality 
between the natural resource governance variable and Facebook penetration. It 
can be seen in this table that these two variables have a positive and significant 
relationship except for the enabling environment dimension of natural resource 
governance. 
  
Table 9. The Effect of Individualism on Corruption: IV Estimates 
 
Composite 
Institutional 
and legal 
setting  
Reporting 
practices  
Safeguards 
and quality 
controls  
 Enabling 
environment 
Facebook 1.244*** 1.163** 1.055** 2.147*** 0.798 
 
(0.421) (0.549) (0.480) (0.793) (0.536) 
Dummy legal origin British -10.352 -20.885 -10.158 -12.011 1.452 
 
(10.827) (14.124) (12.336) (20.396) (13.787) 
Dummy legal origin French -18.186* -21.402 -12.663 -23.852 -20.348 
 
(10.698) (13.955) (12.189) (20.152) (13.623) 
Dummy legal origin: Socialist. -4.941 -19.279 -3.103 7.880 -7.097 
 
(17.319) (22.591) (19.732) (32.623) (22.053) 
GDP per capita (log) -9.721 -13.527 -5.075 -29.711** 4.784 
 
(7.108) (9.272) (8.098) (13.389) (9.051) 
Open -0.215*** -0.208*** -0.222*** -0.300*** -0.121 
 
(0.059) (0.076) (0.067) (0.110) (0.075) 
Minerals rents -0.003 0.068 -0.033 -0.208 0.190 
 
(0.093) (0.121) (0.106) (0.175) (0.118) 
_cons 148.039*** 194.428*** 108.653* 319.668*** 8.795 
 
(55.340) (72.186) (63.052) (104.243) (70.468) 
Overidentification test (p-value) 0.4067 0.2828 0.2828 0.4278 0.1435 
Number of observations 27 27 27 27 27 
R2 0.680 0.368 0.681 0.146 0.761 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *;      
 
5. Conclusion 
The establishment of good institutions is a genuine way of addressing the policy 
syndrome of natural resources curse. Although this perspective is widely 
accepted, we do not have the answers clearly documented empirically, at least in 
transversal terms. Until recently, the level of governance of natural resources 
could not really be assessed for lack of an ad hoc indicator. 
This article has focused on providing a cross-cutting response using the Natural 
Resource Governance Institute's recent natural resource governance indicator. It 
has shown empirically that the governance of natural resources improves with the 
strong penetration of social networks or social media such as the case of 
Facebook. This conclusion is robust to several tests, including changes in 
estimation techniques, the decomposition of the governance index, the addition of 
other control variable and the correction for outliers. Also, we tested the causality 
between the two variables, correcting the endogeneity of the Facebook penetration 
variable. 
Ultimately, countries that have better governance of natural resources are those 
that are equally associated with a strong Facebook penetration. Increasing this 
penetration directly causes better governance. In the light of these findings, the 
main policy implication from this study is that policies designed to increase 
Facebook penetration will benefit from better governance standards. Such benefits 
will go a long way to improving the governance of natural resources.   
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